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COMES NOW Appellant Stephen W. Adams aka Steven (sic) Wayne Adams (Stephen) 
by and through his attorney of record James M. Runsvold and, pursuant to IAR Rule 35, presents 
his opening brief as follows: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Appeal from district court decision affirming magistrate's dismissal of Father's petition to 
establish his custody/visitation rights and modify his child support obligation upon finding that 
Father is in criminal contempt for non-payment of child support. The finding of contempt is not 
appealed from. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page-3 
(ii) A filiation order was entered by default on June 11,2003. Judgment and Order of Filiation, 
R., p. 39. It orders Appellant Stephen Wayne Adams aka Steven Wayne Adams (Stephen) to pay 
child support of$635.00 per month commencing April 1,2003. Id., R., p. 40. Respondent Amy 
Slane's (Amy's) contempt motion was filed on March 11,2010, alleging non-payment of child 
support. R., p. 46. Stephen timely answered, asserting affirmative defenses, and petitioned to 
establish his custody/visitation rights and separately moved to modify his support obligation. R., 
pp. 65, 69. Amy answered and counterclaimed for modification of custody/visitation. R., p. 89. 
Amy's contempt motion was tried first and Stephen was found to be in criminal contempt and, 
upon his admission, found to be unable to "purge" his contempt by paying the contempt amount. 
R., p. 353. Having found Stephen to be in criminal contempt, and on Amy's oral motion, the 
magistrate summarily dismissed Stephen's motions to establish custody/visitation and modify 
support. R., p. 332. Stephen was subsequently sentenced to jail and assessed attorney's fees and 
costs. R., pp. 344, 349, and 351. 
(iii) Stephen's appeal to the district Court was denied, the District Court affirming the 
magistrate's dismissal of Stephen's motions and awarding attorney fees against him. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, R., p. 420. The attorney fee issue is still pending in the 
District Court. R., pp. 428, 436, 472, 474, and 477. 
(iv) Stephen and Amy are the parents ofLR.S., born in 2003, now age 9. They have never been 
married. Stephen was found in contempt for not paying court-ordered monthly child support due 
of $635 for the month of November, 2009, despite having the then-present ability to do so. 
Because of the disposition of the case, there have been no findings going to the best interest of 
the child, the parties' current child support incomes, or related matters. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(a) Whether, as a matter of law, the magistrate erred in dismissing Stephen's petition to 
establish his rights to child custody/visitation. 
(b) Whether, as a matter of law, the magistrate erred in dismissing Stephen's motion to 
modify child support. 
(c)WhetherNabv.Nab, 114 Idaho 572, 757P.2d 1231 (Ct.App.1988) andRodriguez 
v. Rodriguez, 150 Idaho 614,249 P.3d 413 (Ct. App. 2011) should be interpreted to allow 
establishment of child custody/visitation and/or modification of child support in this case, or 
alternatively, declared to be no longer applicable to the circumstances of this case. 
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ARGUMENT 
This is a case of first impression. Appellant Stephen Adams is asking the Supreme Court 
to take another look at Nab and its progeny, notably Rodriguez, both Court of Appeals cases, in 
light of the current court rules categorizing and defining contempt proceedings, Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure (IRCP) Rule 75. 
Additionally, Stephen is asking the Supreme Court to again, 66 years after Brown v. 
Brown, 66 Idaho 625, 165 P.2d 886 (1946), directly address the tension between the 
"paramount" consideration of the best interest of the child in custody cases and the imperative to 
enforce court orders through the contempt power. 
It is Stephen's position that his willful contempt in failing to pay child support for the 
month of November, 2012, is not sufficient grounds to deprive his minor daughter ofa 
relationship with him. It is further his position that denying him a reduction in his child support 
obligation because of his willful contempt to pay child support in November 2012, is a sanction 
not authorized by statute, and therefore in excess of the magistrate's jurisdiction, and will simply 
bury him deeper in debt, with no benefit to anyone, least of all his daughter. 
I. STEPHEN'S "VERIFIED MOTION TO MODIFY FILIATION ORDER" WAS NOT A 
MOTION TO MODIFY CUSTODYNISITATION AND THEREFORE IS NOT BARRED BY 
RODRIGUEZ. 
The Filiation Order, R., p. 39, does not provide for custody or visitation of the minor 
child, only child support and related financial matters. Stephen's Verified Motion to Modify 
Filiation Order, R, p. 65, therefore seeks to establish for the first time his custodial/visitation 
rights. As such, it is not a motion to modify at all, with respect to custody/visitation. Its 
"modification" component relates only to the support modification incident to the change to 
"sole legal and physical custody", id., sought by Stephen through his petition. 
Therefore, the line of authorities disallowing modifications by contemnors in certain 
circumstances, including Rodriguez, simply has no application to Stephen's petition to establish 
his custody/visitation rights. Cf., Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 96, 253 P.3d 764, 770 (Ct. 
App. 2011). ("We decline to apply the 'no modification while in contempt' rule outside the true 
modification context."). It is subject only to considerations of best interests of the child, or ought 
to be. 
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Additionally, "Rule 8(t) I.R.C.P. provides that '(a)ll pleadings shall be so construed as to 
do substantial justice' ... 'The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in 
which one misstep by counsel may be decisive of the outcome and accept the principle that the 
purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits' ... As early as 1910 this court 
held that 'the sufficiency of the pleading must be determined upon the facts pleaded, rather than 
upon any name given to the pleading or the cause of action"', Archer v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 
Idaho 861, 866-67,434 P. 2d 79,84-85 (1967). Therefore, mislabeling of Stephen's petition to 
establish his custody/visitation rights as a modification is or should be of no consequence. 
II. NAB CANNOT APPLY IN A CRIMINAL CONTEMPT CASE. 
The magistrate relied upon the authority of Nab to dismiss Stephen's motions to modify. 
Nab holds that only where a contemnor cannot purge his contempt for reasons beyond his 
control, such as because he is incarcerated, does the court have jurisdiction to modify a 
contemnor's child support obligation. Id., 114 Idaho at 518. By definition, however, criminal 
contempt cannot be purged. "A criminal sanction is one that is unconditional. The contemnor 
cannot avoid the sanction entirely or have it cease by doing what the contemnor had been 
previously ordered by the court to do," IRCP Rule 75(a)(7). That is, purging is not a concept 
consistent with a criminal contempt. Rather, a requirement to "purge" a criminal contempt is 
actually a term of probation imposed as part of the sanction. Johnson v. Howard, 150 Idaho 330, 
332,246 P. 3d 983,985, n.2 (2011). Therefore, Nab has no application to a criminal contempt. 
III. ALTERNATIVELY, NAB DOES NOT BAR A CRIMINAL CONTEMNOR. 
Under the rule of Nab, a court does have jurisdiction to modify child support if the 
contemnor cannot purge his contempt through no fault of his own. Rodriguez, supra, 150 Idaho 
at 616,249 P. 3d at 415. It is not however a criminal contemnor's fault that his criminal 
contempt cannot be purged. It cannot be purged, by definition. IRCP Rule 75(a)(7), supra. 
Therefore, Nab does not bar a criminal contemnor's motion to modify. 
Nab itself makes clear that the contemnor's contempt in that case was a civil not a 
criminal contempt. The Nab court recognized that a denial of a modification could be a 
reasonable civil contempt sanction to compel compliance with the child support order, but only if 
the contemnor could come into compliance: 
Here, the [magistrate] explained to Nab that he must purge himself of the 
contempt before his motion to modify would be considered. Apparently, 
in the magistrate's opinion, refusal to consider modifying the support 
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requirement was a civil contempt sanction intended to coerce compliance 
with the prior child support order. To justify a coercive sanction, a 
person held in civil contempt must be able to comply with the court 
order in question. 
* * * 
However, sanctioning Nab for contempt by refusing to consider his 
motion when he is unable to purge himself of that contempt runs 
contrary to the very purpose of civil contempt. 
Id., 114 Idaho at 517-518 (emphasis added). 
IV. RODRIGUEZ IS DISTINGUISHABLE. 
The Court of Appeals recently concluded that" the holding in Nab applies in 
modification of child custody or visitation proceedings," Rodriguez, supra, 150 Idaho at 617, 249 
P. 3d at 416. However, since the magistrate had "failed to make a determination of whether it 
was presently impossible for [contemnor] to purge herself of her contempt", id., the Rodriguez 
case was remanded to the magistrate for such determination. 
In the present case, the magistrate expressly made a finding that Father could not "purge" 
his contempt: "Respondent Adams, based on his own admission, has been found to be unable to 
purge his contempt ... ", Amended Order Dismissing (etc.), supra, para. 3, R., p. 354. Thus unlike 
Rodriguez where the case had to be remanded for a determination as to whether the contemnor 
could "purge" her contempt, the magistrate in the present case expressly found that Stephen 
could not "purge" his contempt. 
Notably, Rodriguez does not require that the contemnor show that the impossibility of 
purging the contempt is for reasons beyond his or her control. It thus appears to have loosened 
the rigid rule of Nab in removing the "beyond contemnor's control" element. Notably, 
Rodriguez, despite its pronouncement extending Nab, reverses the magistrate's dismissal and 
remands for an evidentiary hearing, thereby upholding the district court acting as an intermediate 
appellate court. 
V. RODRIGUEZ IS WRONGLY DECIDED INSOFAR AS IT EXTENDS NAB TO 
CUSTODY. 
The analysis in Rodriguez starts with Sauvageau v. Sauvageau, 59 Idaho 190,81 P. 2d 
731 (1938). The relevant language is dicta: 
[W]e observe, in the outset, that it appears that appellant is in contempt 
of the district court for failure to comply with the order and judgment of 
the court, requiring him to pay attorney's fees and monthly support and 
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maintenance for the wife and child. Under such circumstances, it is 
doubtful if the appellant would be entitled to a hearing on appeal until he 
either complies with the order or purges himself of contempt; but we are 
not passing on that question [citations deleted] for the reason that the 
respondent is the one in whose favor the order was made and she is the 
one who applied to the court to set the case down for hearing on its 
merits. 
Id., 59 Idaho at 193 (emphasis added). Thus Sauvagau is not controlling authority on the Nab 
Issue. 
The second case cited by Rodriguez is misconstrued therein. In Brown v. Brown, 66 
Idaho 625, 165 P. 2d 886 (1946), mother was awarded custody of the three children and father 
was ordered to pay child support. However, father absconded with the children and failed to pay 
support. He then moved to modify the custody and support. Having been found in contempt by 
the trial court, the father was found to have no right to seek a child support modification: 
[U]ntil purged of the contempt by payment of past due installments, 
[father] has no right as the moving party to be heard in connection 
therewith or as to modification of future payments under the original 
decree. 
Id., 66 Idaho at 628 (citing to Sauvageau, supra). The Brown court continued, however, as 
follows: 
[Father] by reason of his failure to purge himself of his contempt by 
payment or valid excuse, is in no position as the moving party to 
question the court's order as to custody. [citing Sauvageu]. The welfare 
of the children is, however, paramount, and independent of the [father's] 
situation, and the court's specific charge. 
Id., 66 Idaho at 629 (citing then-section 31-705 I.e.A., et al.)( emphasis added). Recognizing that, 
irrespective of father's contempt, the Court's "paramount" duty was to the welfare of the 
children it upheld the trial court's award of custody of the older son to father, and remanded for 
determination as to placement of the other two children. In other words, Brown does not decline 
to change custody to a parent in contempt for non-payment of child support, where the change is 
in the best interest of the child. 
Rodriquez next cites Hoagland v. Hoagland, 67 Idaho 67, 170 P. 2d 609 (1946) as 
continuing and enhancing the line of cases starting with Sauvageau. 
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Hoagland, denying any modifications, was decided just four months after the Brown 
court had upheld a modification of custody giving Father custody of one of the three children 
even though he had been found to be "in default, therefore in contempt", Brown, supra, 66 Idaho 
at 628. Only three justices participated in Hoagland, including Justice Givens, who concurred. 
Justice Givens had written the unanimous, five-justice Brown opinion, in which the author of 
Hoagland, Justice Miller, had concurred. Such an apparent departure from then-recent precedent 
is, at first glance, inexplicable. A closer reading suggests a different understanding of Hoagland. 
The Hoagland divorce decree was entered in Boundary County. It awarded custody of the 
parties' twelve year old son to Father and their six year old daughter to Mother. Father was 
ordered to pay child support. Both parties remarried and Mother moved with daughter to 
Grangeville. Father remained with son near Bonners Ferry. Visitation whereby the children 
regularly saw each other was exercised. 
A year and a half later, Father moved to modify to change custody of the daughter to 
himself. Mother responded with a show-cause why Father should not be held in contempt for 
failure to pay child support. At the trial, Mother testified that Father had not paid the child 
support. The trial court granted the motion to modify custody and support, and denied the 
contempt. On the child support issue, the trial court found, '''There is no pleading and no 
evidence in this case that permits the making of any order or judgment with reference to the past 
due payments of support money"', id., 67 Idaho 69. The Supreme Court thought otherwise, noted 
the evidence showing non-payment, and stated as follows: "[Father's] failure to make the 
payments placed him in contempt and he was not entitled as the moving party to any 
consideration until purged of the contempt," id. 
While acknowledging that proof had been presented supporting the change of custody, 
the Supreme Court stated as follows: 
Regardless, however, of the facts found to exist, the trial court was 
without authority to proceed with the hearing or modify the decree until 
the applicant had purged himself of the contempt by payment of the 
delinquent installments. 
Id., 67 Idaho 70; whereupon, the Supreme Court reversed with directions to dismiss. 
It is important to note that the trial court had not found Father to be in contempt. Further, 
of course, modem concepts of contempt were not applied, including elements, burdens of proof, 
affirmative defenses, and categorization as criminal or civil. It appears however that the 
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dismissal of Father's motions to modify was based on a civil contempt since, as the Supreme 
Court stated, Father could not proceed "until [he] had purged himself of the contempt by 
payment of the delinquent installments", id. The most reasonable inference is that Father could 
purge his contempt by paying the back child support as ordered, whereupon he could return to 
court with his motions. An unavoidable sanction, of the kind characterizing criminal contempt, 
was not being placed upon him. 
One must wonder as to what extent the Hoagland court was influenced by the "tender 
years doctrine", then in full force, which favored young children staying with Mother. See, e.g., 
Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, 81 P.2d 1081(1932). One must wonder as well to what extent 
the Hoagland court inadvertently conflated child support issues with custody issues. The 
Hoagland court makes no mention of best interests of the child much less makes any attempt to 
reconcile its contempt power with its duty, well recognized by then, to give "paramount" 
consideration to the best interests of the child. Kreiger, supra. 
Hoagland must be viewed as an aberration in Idaho law at least until, 65 years later, 
Rodriguez was decided. 
Lusty v. Lusty, 70 Idaho 382, 219 P. 2d 280 (1950) is cited next. It is an alimony (spousal 
maintenance) case, not a child support case. When the ex-husband was charged with contempt 
for non-payment, he denied the charge and counterclaimed to modify the alimony amount. The 
trial court found in the ex-husband's favor. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the 
evidence did not support the trial court's finding. Rather the evidence showed that the ex-
husband could have paid but chose not to. Under those circumstances, the Lusty court found that 
the ex-husband "was not entitled to urge a modification of the decree, nor may he do so until he 
has complied with the terms of the original decree", id., 70 Idaho at 388. Obviously the 
"paramount" consideration of best interests did not come into play in this non-custody case. 
Also, it is clearly a civil contempt case since future compliance will allow the ex-husband to 
proceed. 
Finally, Rodriguez cites Nab. It notes correctly that "Nab dealt with modification of child 
support and not modification of child custody or visitation", id., 150 Idaho at 617, 249 P .3d at 
617. It then simply announces, "Having noted that distinction, we conclude that the holding of 
Nab applies in modification of child custody proceedings", id. There is no attempt at all to 
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reconcile the application of Nab to custody cases with the bedrock principle that best interests 
are "paramount". 
Child custody and visitation issues are to be decided in the best interest of the child. 
Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 187 P. 3d. 1234 (2008); Krieger v. Kreiger, 59 Idaho 301,81 
P. 2d 1081 (1938); Idaho Code Section 32-717. Indeed, "the best interest of the children is of 
paramount importance," Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 148 P.3d 1267, 1272 (2006); Peterson v. 
Peterson, 12.15 ISCR 134, 137 (July 17,2012). All relevant factors are to be considered in 
determining "best interest", including those listed in Idaho Code Section 32-717. Id., subsection 
(1); Roeh v. Roeh, 113 Idaho 557, 558, 746 P.2d 1016 (Ct. App. 1987). Among the listed factors 
is the character and circumstances of the individuals involved. Id., subsection (1)(e). This factor 
seems to encompass contemptuous failure to support the child. If not, it may be one of the "all 
relevant factors" not expressly listed. However, while contempt may be considered in a custody 
case, it no more than any other one factor may be considered exclusively or given undue weight. 
Thus, for example, "[ c ]ontempt of court on the part of the custodial parent will not alone justify 
taking custody from such parent," Kalousek v. Kalousek, 77 Idaho 433, 439, 293 P. 2d 953, 957 
(1956); Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170,627 P.2d 800 (1981). 
Irrelevant factors may not be considered, Brownson v. Allen, 134 Idaho 60, 63, 995 P.2d 
830,833(2000); Roeh v. Roeh, supra; nor may the court assign too much weight to anyone 
factor. Schultz v. Shultz, supra; Moye v. Moye, supra. 
The determination of custody issues "cannot be used as a means of punishment or reward 
of either parent", Kalousek v. Kalousek, supra. 
Since "paramount" means "pre-eminent" or "supreme", that is, above all others, best 
interest must trump contempt. As noted in Brown, supra, "The welfare of the children is, 
however, paramount to, and independent of the [contemnor's] situation, and the court's specific 
charge", id., 66 Idaho at 629. Nothing has changed, in the child custody statute or case law, in 
the last 66 years to change that fundamental principle. The only cases to the contrary, Hoagland 
and now Rodriguez, must be viewed as aberrations. 
Foreign authorities support the view that the Nab rule should not be extended to custody 
cases. Thus, while acknowledging Hoagland and Brown, supra, the Court of Appeals of Missouri 
has stated as follows: 
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Accordingly, we rule that the divorce court in its discretion and in a 
proper case may impose upon the father, as a price for the maintenance 
of his motion to modify the custody provisions of a divorce decree, the 
obligation of paying in full all arrearages due under the child support 
provisions of the decree. In this connection see In re Elmer's 
Guardianship, 125 N.J. Eq. 148,4 A.2d 387; Hoagland v. Hoagland, 67 
Idaho 67, 170 P. 2d 609; Brown v. Brown, 66 Idaho 625, 165 P. 2d 886. 
It should be emphasized, however, that this rule should not be applied 
peremptorily or in any case where its application would be contrary to 
the welfare of the child involved. The power to invoke the rule should be 
exercised sparingly, and only after sufficient inquiry has been made into 
the status of the child to satisfy the court that the child's best welfare will 
not be prejudiced. 
Link v. Link, 262 S.W. 2d 318 (Mo. App. 1953). 
A similar sentiment has been expressed by the Virginia Supreme Court, in quoting 
approvingly from the court below: 
The decree also stated that the present proceeding involved mainly the 
welfare and best interests of the child, and that these were not dependent 
upon whether the appellee was delinquent in the payments theretofore 
required of him. 
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 182 Va. 775, 30 S. E. 2d 707 (Va. 1944). 
The predictable result of Rodriguez will be this: children, even if neglected and abused, 
or at least not placed in their "best interests", will be left with their present custodial parent if the 
other parent did not pay support in anyone month when he or she arguably could have. Thus the 
child support obligor's acts and circumstances in relation only to child support will determine 
whether, as a matter of law, the child is left in unfavorable circumstances. 
The flip side of Rodriguez is that it sets the stage for applying Nab to dismiss a wholly-
meritorious motion to increase child support for the benefit of the child when the movant has 
denied court-ordered visitation on at least one occasion. 
Rodriguez is clearly bad law and should be overruled by the Supreme Court. 
VI. JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY IS PRESUMED TO BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
CHILD. 
The legislature has spoken clearly and unequivocally: Absent a finding that a parent is a 
habitual perpetrator of domestic violence and absent a preponderance of evidence to the contrary, 
it is presumed that joint custody is in the best interest of the child. Idaho Code Section 32-717B, 
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subsections (4) and (5). Peterson v. Peterson. Here, there has been no evidence presented nor 
finding made to overcome the presumption. Therefore, presumptively, Stephen is entitled to joint 
custody of the parties' daughter. This includes "physical custody ... shared by the parents in such 
a way as to assure the child ... offrequent and continuing contact with both parents", id., 
subsection (1). 
The Supreme Court has underscored the potency of the statutory presumption and found 
further support in coordinate statutes: 
In addition to those factors listed [in Section 32-717(1 )], it is presumed 
in our law that a continuing relationship with both parents is in a child's 
best interest. Idaho Code Sections 32-717B(4), 32-1007, and 18-4506. 
That is a fundamental principle that must be considered. 
Hopper v. Hooper, 144 Idaho 624, 167 P. 3d 761, 764 (2007); Peterson v. Peterson, supra. 
The magistrate's ruling has in effect deprived Stephen of joint custody of the parties' 
daughter on grounds other than the only ground permitted by the statute, the best interest of the 
child, with habitual domestic violence alone being decisive. It thus has improperly deprived 
I.R.S. of the "continuing relationship with both parents" to which she is entitled. 
VII. INTERTWINING OF SUPPORT AND CUSTODY IS IRRELEVANT. 
The magistrate's order states in pertinent part as follows: 
Since the Respondent's motion to modify custody is indivisible from his 
motion to modify child support, his motion to modify incorporating both 
elements must be and hereby are dismissed in their entirety. 
Id., para 5. This is obviously an unfounded statement because Stephen filed two separate motions 
to modify child support, one strictly limited to child support modification on the express grounds 
of income change, Motion to Modify Child Support Order, April 20, 2010; and the other as an 
incident to his petition to establish custody/visitation, Verified Motion to Modify Filiation Order, 
April 20, 2010. R., pp. 65,69. However, the magistrate apparently reasoned that actual custody or 
visitation cannot be established or changed without affecting child support. Therefore, according 
to that reasoning, a custody/visitation change or establishment could be a back door way to get a 
child support modification and, since a contemnor cannot get a child support modification under 
Nab (as he incorrectly understands it), a contemnor also cannot get a custody/visitation order. 
This flawed logic at most proves the law of unintended consequences. 
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Child support has always been linked to child custody, of course: the primary physical 
custodian is generally the one who gets child support from the other parent. Child support is now 
also explicitly linked to visitation, in a limited way: 
Determining shared custody. It is recognized there is an overall increase 
in child rearing costs created by shared custody. If the child spends more 
than 25% of the overnights in a year with each parent, an adjustment in 
the Guidelines amount shall be made. 
IRCP Rule 6( c)( 6), Child Support Guidelines, subsection (e)(1). 
The purpose of the linkage between custody/visitation and child support is expressly 
stated: to recognize the increased cost to the visiting parent when he/she has the children for an 
extended period. For practical reasons, the increased cost is recognized in the child support 
calculation (in effect as a credit) when the extended visitation ("shared custody") has the child 
spending more than a quarter of the overnights with the visiting parent. 
Since the linkage only begins to kick in at the 25% threshold, Stephen's child support 
could not have been affected unless visitation over the threshold was ordered. Typically, with a 
"traditional" visitation schedule of every-other weekend plus a couple weeks in the summer and 
alternating holidays, the overnights do not exceed 25%. Therefore, it is unlikely that Stephen's 
child support obligation could have been affected simply by awarding him visitation. 
In any case, it could not have been the Supreme Court's intent in drafting current 
Guidelines subsection (e)( 1) to impact custody and contempt issues. Rather the purpose in 
amending that section to its current form was to recognize economic reality and to provide some 
guidance to the divorce courts who had been struggling with determining whether there was an 
actual sharing of child rearing costs due to extended visitations, etc. 
Clearly, the magistrate in this case has the tail wagging the dog. The co-mingling of 
support and visitation issues created or recognized by Guidelines subsection (e)(I) cannot 
reasonably be used to summarily dismiss a petition to establish custody/visitation based upon 
child support issues. The line of cases holding that visitation cannot be denied even if child 
support is not paid and, conversely, that child support cannot be withheld simply because 
visitation is denied supports this view. See, M., Kirkwood v. Kirkwood, 83 Idaho 144,363 P. 2d 
1016 (1961). 
VIII. DENIAL OF COURT ACCESS IS NOT AN ALLOWED PENALTY FOR CONTEMPT. 
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The penalties for contempt are specified by the legislature in the contempt statute. Those 
penalties do not include denial of access to the courts. Therefore, the magistrate's refusal to hear 
Stephen's motion to modify custody/visitation because of his contempt is an abuse of discretion. 
The allowable penalties for contempt for non-payment of child support are specified in 
Idaho Code Sections 7-610 and 7-612, as follows: 
Judgment-Penalty. Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court or 
judge must determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty of 
the contempt charged, and if it be adjudged that he is guilty of the 
contempt, a fine may be imposed on him not exceeding five thousand 
dollars ($5,000), or he may be imprisoned not exceeding five (5) days, or 
both; except that if the contempt of which the defendant be adjudged 
guilty be a disobedience of a judgment or order for the support of minor 
children, he may be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) days in 
addition to such fine, under this section, as the court may impose. 
Additionally, the court in its discretion, may award attorney's fees and 
costs to the prevailing party. 
Idaho Code Section 7-610. 
Additional penalties for child support delinquency. In addition to the 
penalties for contempt contained in this chapter, the following additional 
penalties are available for a child support delinquency: 
(1) Work activities. In all cases under chapter 2, title 56, Idaho Code, 
where the custodial parent or children receive temporary assistance for 
families in Idaho, and the obligor owes past due support and is not 
incapacitated, the court may issue an order requiring the obligor to 
participate in work activities. 
(2) License suspension. Pursuant to chapter 14, title 7, Idaho, Code, the 
court may issue an order suspending a license for a child support 
delinquency as defined by section 7-1402. 
Idaho Code Section 7-612. 
Thus the magistrate could have sentenced Stephen to up to 30 days in jail, fined him up to 
$5000, assessed attorney fees and costs against him, ordered him to "participate in work 
activities" (if on state assistance), and/or suspended his licenses. But the magistrate did more: he 
denied Stephen access to the court, preventing him from pursuing his petition for 
custody/visitation and to modify child support. This is an impermissible sanction since it exceeds 
the magistrate's authority under the statute, and is an abuse of discretion. Cf. Smith v. Smith, 
136 Idaho 120, 123-24,29 P.3d 956,959-60 (Ct. App. 2001)Gail time exceeded the 5 days 
allowed by statute); Levan v. Richards, 4 Idaho 667, 43 P. 574 (1896) (accepting argument that 
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"sole power of Court in contempt proceedings is defined by our statute"). It is also contrary to 
the Idaho courts' "general policy of providing [a party] his day in court", Sines v. Blaser, 98 
Idaho 435, 437,566 P.2d 758, 760 (1977). Cf., Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 
129 Idaho 532, 927 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1996). 
IX. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN A WARDING ATTORNEY FEES AGAINST 
STEPHEN. 
The District Court found that "Ms. Slane is the prevailing party on the appeal and is 
thereby entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuantto [IRCP] Rule 75(m) .... " R., p. 426. The 
District Court erred. 
It first must be noted that the issue of attorney's fees and costs is still pending in the 
District Court. Further to the District Court's ruling, Amy timely filed her Memorandum of Costs 
and Fees, R., p. 428; and Stephen timely filed his objection thereto and motion for 
reconsideration, R., p. 436. The attorney fee issue was then noticed for hearing, R., p. 472; the 
parties' exchanged further written arguments, R., p. 474; p. 477; and oral argument was taken. 
However, the District Court has never rendered its decision on the attorney fee issue, beyond its 
pronouncement in its Memorandum Decision and Order, supra. 
In any event, it is error for the District Court to award attorney fees against Stephen at 
least for the following reasons: 
1. Stephen has not appealed his contempt conviction or sentencing. He has only appealed 
the summary dismissal of his motions for custody/visitation and child support modification. 
Notice of Appeal, R., p. 355-56; Appellant's Brief, R., 382-94, 385. Therefore, the statute (court 
rule) authorizing a fee award in a contempt case, IRCP Rule 75(m), which is the statute relied 
upon by the District Court, does not apply. Notably, Stephen has not appealed the award of 
attorney's fees against him by the magistrate, which were awarded under the contempt rules, 
IRCP Rule 75(m). 
2. Stephen's appeal to the District Court was not "brought [or] pursued ... frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation" such as would support an award of fees against him under 
Idaho Code Section 12-121. IRCP Rule 54 (e)(1). In any event, the District Court has not made 
the requisite finding to support an award under that statute: 
Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF Page-16 
that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation; .... 
IRCP Rule 54(e)(l)(emphasis added). 
3. Amy had not claimed a right to an award of attorney fees under the contempt rules on 
Stephen's appeal to the District Court. Respondent's Brief, R., p. 395-404,398 ("Additional 
Issues on Appeal"). She has therefore waived any claim under IRCP Rule 75: 
If the respondent is claiming attorney fees on appeal the respondent must 
so indicate in the division of additional issues on appeal that respondent 
is claiming attorney fees and state the basis for the claim. 
IAR Rule 35 (b)(5)(emphasis added). IAR Rule 35 applies to the District Court appeal brief 
because ofIRCP Rule 83(v), which provides in pertinent part as follows: "Briefs shall be in the 
form ... provided by rules for appeals to the Supreme Court ... ," id. 
CONCLUSION 
In summarily dismissing Stephen's petition to establish his custody/visitation rights and 
modify his child support obligation, the magistrate disregarded the fundamental principle that the 
best interests of the child are "paramount", that is, above all other considerations. Further, the 
magistrate imposed a penalty in excess of his authority under the contempt statute by denying 
access to the courts. Finally, the authority relied upon by the magistrate, the 1988 case of Nab is 
wrongly decided, obsolete, and inapplicable in a criminal contempt case such as this one since 
"purging the contempt" is not possible in such a case. The more recent case of Rodriguez, relied 
upon by the District Court in affirming the magistrate's decision, should not be viewed as 
supporting and extending Nab. 
Stephen respectfully requests the Supreme Court to reverse the magistrate, vacate the 
magistrate's order dismissing Stephen's petition to establish custody/visitation and motion to 
modify support, and remand the matter to the magistrate division with instructions to try 
Stephen's petition and motion and decide them on the merits. 
Additionally, Stephen respectfully requests the Supreme Court vacate the order of the 
District Court awarding attorney fees against him. 
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this __ day ____________ , 2012. 
James M. Runsvold 
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